Judgment: 2008-04-29 · Court archive

High Court allows pension claimant to plead concealment argument against time bar

The court ruled that Walter Croke may plead section 71(1)(b) in reply to Irish Pensions Trust’s limitation defence, while barring his section 44(a) plea. It did not decide whether the claim is time-barred or establish wrongdoing.

High Court · [2008] IEHC 474

Who, what, where, when and why

Who
  • Walter Croke (Plaintiff)
  • Waterford Crystal
  • Irish Pensions Trust Limited (Defendant)
What

The court ruled that Walter Croke may plead section 71(1)(b) in reply to Irish Pensions Trust’s limitation defence, while barring his section 44(a) plea. It did not decide whether the claim is time-barred or establish wrongdoing.

Where

Places mentioned in the report

  • Waterford
When

Judgment:

Why

Reasons reported in the judgment

The judge said the Supreme Court had previously refused permission to add allegations of fraud or deliberate misconduct against the trust to Croke’s statement of claim. That decision constrained what could be pleaded. The High Court found that alleging the trust was “privy” to Waterford Crystal’s alleged fraud under section 44(a) would reintroduce a case the Supreme Court had not permitted.

The High Court has ruled that former Waterford Crystal worker Walter Croke may plead that fraudulent concealment delayed the start of the limitation period for his claim against Irish Pensions Trust Limited. The ruling does not decide whether that argument will succeed or whether his claim is time-barred.

The preliminary issue before Mr Justice Birmingham was whether Croke could plead sections 44 and 71(1)(b) of the Statute of Limitations 1957 in response to the trust’s limitation defence. The court allowed him, at this stage, to plead section 71(1)(b), which concerns a right of action concealed by fraud. It ruled that he could not plead section 44(a), which concerns claims founded on fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which a trustee was party or privy. The judge also indicated, obiter, that Croke could not plead section 71(1)(a), which concerns an action based on the defendant’s fraud.

Croke worked for Waterford Crystal from 1965 to 1992, leaving under a voluntary redundancy package. He claims he was not told about pension options, including a deferred pension, and that the defendants failed to advise him or misadvised him. Irish Pensions Trust, the pension fund’s sole trustee, denied the allegations and pleaded that the claim was statute-barred. Waterford Crystal also denied the allegations and disputed his entitlement to relief.

The judge said the Supreme Court had previously refused permission to add allegations of fraud or deliberate misconduct against the trust to Croke’s statement of claim. That decision constrained what could be pleaded. The High Court found that alleging the trust was “privy” to Waterford Crystal’s alleged fraud under section 44(a) would reintroduce a case the Supreme Court had not permitted.

Section 71(1)(b) was different, the judge said. The court considered whether the pleaded particulars, if established, could support an argument that the cause of action had been concealed in circumstances making it inequitable for the trust to rely on the passage of time. Those particulars included allegations about information given to other former employees and the trust’s participation in the process by which Croke says he was told of only one option. They remain allegations, not findings.

The judge stressed that the ruling was about whether Croke could make the argument, not whether he could prove deliberate wrongdoing or meet the statutory test. The preliminary issue was decided on legal argument and the pleadings, without evidence. The merits of the claim and the trust’s limitation defence remain unresolved.

Read the original court judgment

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