The High Court dismissed an appeal by A.C. against the Hepatitis C and HIV Compensation Tribunal’s decision to reject her claim for compensation for loss of society. The court held that, under the relevant provision of the Hepatitis C Compensation Tribunal Acts 1997 to 2006, “child” did not include a stepchild in her circumstances, and affirmed the Tribunal’s decision.
A.C. is the daughter of D.K., whose second wife, B.McC., died in 2017 from complications of hepatitis C. B.McC. contracted the infection after a blood transfusion during surgery in Ireland in 1987. The Tribunal accepted that hepatitis C was a significant contributory factor in her death and made awards to claimants, including D.K.
A.C. was 27 when her father married B.McC. The judgment records that B.McC. was never in loco parentis to A.C., and that she was not adopted by her stepmother. The Tribunal dismissed A.C.’s application after deciding, as a preliminary issue, that she was not a “child” eligible to claim for loss of society under section 5(3B)(b). A.C. appealed that decision.
Her counsel argued that the Acts, as remedial legislation, should be interpreted generously and that “child” should include a stepchild. He also argued that excluding A.C. was discriminatory and incompatible with her rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. The Minister for Health and Children submitted that the legislation expressly distinguished “child” from “stepchild” among eligible dependants, and that the statutory wording limited loss-of-society claims to a child, spouse or parent of the deceased.
Mr Justice Bernard J. Barton said the court had to interpret the provision generously, but only as far as its wording fairly allowed. He concluded that “child” meant the deceased’s natural or adopted child, or a person to whom the deceased had been in loco parentis. The Acts separately identified stepchildren as dependants for some purposes, but did not include them in the narrower group entitled to claim for loss of society.
The judge was not convinced that A.C.’s Article 8 family-life rights were engaged. He also found that her situation differed from that of a stepchild who had been adopted or cared for by the deceased as a parent. The statutory limit was objectively justified and convention-compliant, he ruled.
The appeal was a rehearing limited to the issue of A.C.’s eligibility for this type of claim. The court did not determine a compensation amount for her. It dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Tribunal’s decision.