The High Court has refused an application to quash Paul Hogan’s return for trial to the Dublin Circuit Criminal Court, ruling that an omitted word in the statement of charges did not invalidate the return.
Mr Justice Faherty delivered the judgment on 12 May 2016. The case concerned a charge that, on 21 January 2014, Hogan possessed a stolen BMW car key, knowing it was stolen or being reckless as to whether it was stolen. The alleged offence was under section 18(1) of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001.
The charge sheet included the word “property” before “to wit BMW car key”. But in the statement of charges served in the book of evidence, that word was omitted at that point. Hogan argued that possessing stolen property was an essential part of the offence and that the charge as written did not allege an offence known to law. He also challenged the District Court’s authority to send him forward for trial and the prosecution’s consent to that step.
The respondents said the omission was a typographical error. They argued the charge was clear from its wording and context, including the car key, the later reference to “property” and the cited statutory provision.
The court accepted that possession of stolen property is an essential ingredient of the offence. It found, however, that the omission did not make the charge an “empty formula” or render it meaningless. The statement described the item as a BMW car key, referred to property later in the charge and cited the statutory provision. Read on its face, it contained enough of the offence’s ingredients to make clear what charge Hogan faced.
The judgment distinguished earlier cases involving a charge or return that failed to identify an offence with sufficient particularity. It said the relevant question was whether the return, including the statement of charges, created uncertainty about the offence. The court considered the statement itself, while finding the earlier charge number and statutory reference complemented the information it contained.
The court concluded that the District Judge had jurisdiction to send Hogan forward, the Director of Public Prosecutions’ consent was lawful, and the Circuit Criminal Court had jurisdiction to try him. It refused the relief sought. The judgment did not determine whether Hogan committed the alleged offence; it concerned the validity of the return for trial.