The Supreme Court dismissed Denis O’Brien’s appeal against a High Court ruling that allowed the Moriarty Tribunal to proceed to public hearings on the purchase of Doncaster Rovers Football Club and Michael Lowry’s purported connection to it.
In a judgment delivered on 16 February 2006, Denham J. rejected both grounds of appeal: whether the Tribunal’s terms of reference covered transactions after its establishment, and whether there was sufficient information to justify public hearings.
O’Brien had sought certiorari quashing the Tribunal’s decision and a permanent injunction preventing the hearings. The High Court refused his application on 24 August 2005. On appeal, O’Brien argued that the terms of reference did not extend to later transactions and that the Tribunal’s decision, made on 27 May 2004, to proceed publicly lacked sufficient support.
On the timing issue, the Supreme Court held that the Tribunal’s terms of reference contained no express time limit. The Court considered the Tribunal’s interpretation—that it could inquire into payments made while Lowry held public office, including after the terms of reference were adopted—to be reasonable and open to it. Transactions could involve multiple stages, the judgment said, and whether actions formed part of transactions under inquiry was primarily for the Tribunal to decide.
On the public-hearing issue, the Court said the Tribunal had discretion to decide what matters should proceed to a hearing. In this inquiry, “evidence” in the terms of reference meant relevant available information, rather than evidence in the strict courtroom sense. The Court applied the established standard that it should not interfere unless the Tribunal’s decision was irrational, unreasonable or contrary to law, and found O’Brien had not met that threshold.
The Court affirmed the High Court order and dismissed the appeal. It did not determine the underlying facts about the Doncaster transaction or Lowry’s purported connection to it; those matters remained for the Tribunal’s public hearings. Denham J. also observed that court proceedings can delay a tribunal’s work, while recognising the fundamental right of access to the courts.