The Supreme Court dismissed the Minister for Justice’s appeal against an extension of time granted to a mother and her two children to seek judicial review of deportation decisions. It also affirmed the High Court’s grant of leave to bring the case, while removing one ground concerning an earlier refusal of refugee status.
The family, identified in the judgment by initials, are from South Africa and belong to the Zulu ethnic group. They arrived in Ireland in November 2001 and sought asylum. Their applications were refused, and their appeals to the Refugee Appeals Tribunal were rejected. Deportation orders were made on 7 August 2003 and notified by letter dated 25 September.
The family sought leave for judicial review on 28 October 2003, outside the 14-day period under the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000. The High Court extended the deadline and granted leave on specified grounds, staying implementation of the deportation orders pending the judicial review’s outcome. The Minister appealed.
The Supreme Court said the evidence about the period before the application was filed contained gaps and contradictions, including uncertainty over when the mother received the deportation notice and how her case papers moved between people and legal services. It found good and sufficient reason to extend time, taking account of the roughly two-week delay, the mother’s efforts to obtain legal help and the serious consequences deportation could have. The court said the children were infants and could not be blamed for delay. It did not accept that the mother was personally blameworthy for giving her papers to a person who did not provide them promptly, and declined to hold her responsible for her solicitors’ conduct.
The court also considered whether the proposed judicial review had an arguable case, as required when deciding whether to extend time. It concluded that the High Court had properly exercised its discretion. The judgment did not decide the substantive challenges to the deportation decisions.
On the separate challenge to the grant of leave, the Supreme Court said leave should be set aside only in a plain case. It found that one permitted ground—challenging the first applicant’s refugee-status refusal—could not proceed because that decision had not been challenged within the statutory period or at all. The appeal was dismissed, and the High Court order was affirmed with that ground removed. The judicial review itself remained to be determined.