The High Court struck out Matthew O’Dea’s housing proceedings after the parties agreed to end them following an offer of alternative accommodation. The court made no order for costs, leaving each side to bear its own.
The judgment, delivered by Miss Justice Laffoy on 4 March 2011, dealt only with costs and the formal conclusion of the case. The court did not determine whether Dublin City Council was required to re-house O’Dea urgently or whether he was entitled to an interlocutory injunction.
O’Dea had become a council tenant in October 2007, taking over a two-bedroom flat in Dublin’s north inner city after his mother. He said he feared for his safety there and had sought a transfer for about 18 months before starting proceedings. The council had granted him priority on exceptional social grounds, but maintained that suitable accommodation was not available in his preferred area. It also initially treated rent arrears as an obstacle to a transfer; in October 2010, it said the arrears would not prevent a transfer and could be carried forward.
O’Dea’s application sought orders requiring the council to consider re-housing him, house him away from the flat, and consider emergency accommodation or financial assistance under section 10 of the Housing Act 1988. The council disputed that it owed the duties claimed, including whether O’Dea qualified as homeless and whether it had authority to provide the requested financial support.
On 16 December 2010, while the injunction application was part-heard, the council offered an apartment in Area H, subject to allocation formalities, surrender of the existing tenancy and responsibility for the accumulated rent arrears. The judgment later refers to the offer as alternative accommodation in Area P. O’Dea accepted an apartment in Area P by letter the following day. The tenancy formalities were completed on 6 January 2011. The court did not resolve the discrepancy in the area descriptions.
When the hearing resumed on 21 December, O’Dea’s counsel said he would not pursue the injunction or substantive action because he considered the outcome satisfactory. The only remaining issue was costs. Laffoy J held that the court had made no determination on the injunction or the substantive claims, and should not speculate about how the injunction application would have been decided. She concluded that the parties’ agreement had resolved the dispute and that the proper order was for each party to bear its own costs.
The court therefore struck out the injunction application and proceedings, as the parties agreed, made no order for costs and gave each party liberty to apply if a relevant matter had not been covered.