The High Court ordered David Synnott to pay Caoimhe Haughey’s costs of applications for interim and interlocutory injunctive relief, and of his unsuccessful application to appoint a receiver over the assets of the Lawline solicitors’ partnership. Execution of the costs orders was stayed until the underlying proceedings are determined.
In a judgment delivered on 8 October 2012, Ms Justice Laffoy considered the costs of the applications as separate interlocutory events. The substantive action between the former Lawline partners was still proceeding, and the court did not decide the disputed issues about a written partnership agreement or the validity of Haughey’s notice of dissolution.
Haughey had given notice on 26 August 2011 that the partnership would dissolve from 30 September and sought Synnott’s co-operation in winding it down. The judgment records that Synnott disputed the notice’s effect. On 2 October 2011, he entered the partnership’s offices and removed files and interfered with computers and the server, according to the account of events in an earlier judgment.
Haughey applied urgently for relief. Orders made on 7 October required Synnott to return Lawline files that day, restore the computers and server to working order as soon as possible, and not interfere with telephone communications to the offices. Justice Laffoy found Haughey had succeeded in obtaining the urgently needed relief and ordered Synnott to pay the costs of both injunction applications.
Synnott had also sought a receiver or receiver and manager over the partnership’s assets. The court dismissed that application in a December 2011 judgment, finding it misconceived. Justice Laffoy said its outcome was a discrete event whose costs could be decided without waiting for the trial, and ordered Synnott to pay Haughey’s costs of that application as well.
Synnott asked the court to stay execution of the costs orders until the trial. Haughey opposed a stay. Justice Laffoy ordered that execution be stayed until the proceedings are determined, while noting Haughey could still have the costs taxed if necessary. The judgment made no observation about how the costs of the substantive action would ultimately be dealt with.