The High Court has dismissed a judicial review brought by an Israeli woman who challenged a decision affirming the recommendation that she should not be declared a refugee in Ireland.
Mr Justice David Keane delivered the judgment on 3 October 2018. The challenge concerned a Refugee Appeals Tribunal decision of 7 November 2016. The court rejected the application on its merits and said it was therefore unnecessary to decide whether there was good and sufficient reason to extend the deadline for bringing the case.
The applicant, identified in the judgment only as G.E., was born in 1997. She claimed that returning to Israel would expose her to persecution because of her objection to compulsory military service. She said she feared being required to take part, directly or indirectly, in acts that would amount to war crimes or other acts excluded under refugee law, and feared prosecution or punishment if she refused to serve.
The tribunal had found that she had not sought legal redress in Israel to avoid military service, and that a process existed through which she could seek conscientious objector status. It also found that her future military unit, posting and duties had not been determined. The High Court described the claim as premature, noting that she had not applied for an exemption and the evidence did not establish that one would have been refused.
The applicant argued that the tribunal had applied the wrong legal test, misread the relevant European Union rules, reached an unreasonable conclusion about the risk of involvement in prohibited acts, and failed to deal fairly with an earlier tribunal decision that had allowed similar appeals. The judge rejected each of those grounds. He said the tribunal was entitled to find that the material before it did not establish that Israel engaged in systematic acts or official indifference allowing war crimes, or that the applicant would be required to take part in such acts.
The judge also found that the tribunal had explained why it did not follow the earlier decision: the evidence relied on there was not clearly identified, and legal developments had occurred in the meantime. He said that earlier decision had no authority because the tribunal member had expressed a personal opinion about Israel’s past conduct, creating objective bias.
The judgment’s comments about the late application were obiter, meaning they were not necessary to the outcome. The judge said the solicitor’s explanation that an unusually onerous workload caused the delay could not amount to good and sufficient reason for extending the statutory deadline.