The High Court refused to surrender Poul John Aamond to Denmark under a European arrest warrant, finding that the 18-year lapse since the alleged offences and the circumstances of his earlier release made surrender oppressive or invidious.
Mr Justice Michael Peart delivered the judgment on 24 November 2006. Denmark sought Aamond’s surrender to face trial on three alleged drug offences dating from 1988. The allegations concerned cocaine transported by sea from waters north of Aruba, off Venezuela, to waters off the Bahamas. Aamond was said to have been first mate on the vessel Nerma during one of the alleged trips. The allegations were not findings of guilt.
Aamond had previously been arrested in Ireland after Denmark sought his extradition in 1993. The Supreme Court ordered his release in 1994 after finding that Irish law at the time did not permit extradition for the alleged offences committed outside Denmark. In an affidavit opposing the new request, Aamond said he had rebuilt his life in Waterford after that release and believed the extradition matter was over.
The European arrest warrant was issued in Denmark on 26 July 2005, and Aamond was arrested in Ireland on 22 August 2006. The court rejected his argument that surrender was barred under section 44 of the European Arrest Warrant Act. It held that, by the time the court considered the request, Vanuatu’s accession to an international convention meant the Nerma qualified as a vessel covered by Irish legislation permitting prosecution for the relevant extraterritorial conduct. The court said that change meant section 44 did not prohibit surrender.
The judge then considered the passage of time under sections 40 and 37 of the Act. He found the lapse since the alleged offences exceptional and treated the previous Supreme Court decision and the new surrender regime as exceptional circumstances. Aamond had not identified specific prejudice to his ability to defend himself. The judge considered that a fair trial in Denmark could still be held and that delay alone would not prevent surrender under one interpretation of the law.
However, given uncertainty about the proper approach to delay, the judge adopted the interpretation more favourable to the requested person pending clarification by the Supreme Court. He concluded that, considering the exceptional lapse and circumstances together, surrender would be oppressive or invidious. The court therefore refused to make a surrender order. It did not determine whether Aamond committed the alleged offences.