The High Court has refused an application to prohibit the prosecution of a man facing 93 counts alleging sexual offences against his daughter, finding that the delay in her report was explicable and that the claimed loss of potential defence evidence did not establish a risk of an unfair trial.
The judgment, delivered by Quirke J. on 27 July 2005, concerned a judicial review application seeking to stop the prosecution. The allegations cover conduct said to have occurred between November 1969 and October 1982 in the family home in K., Dublin. The judgment’s factual account says the alleged offences against the daughter occurred between November 1973 and October 1982 and included indecent assault, buggery, incest and rape. These are allegations; the court’s review was not a determination of guilt.
The applicant argued that the complainant’s report came between 19 and 26 years after the alleged offending and that delay had impaired his ability to defend himself. He also challenged more than eight months between the Garda investigation files being sent to the Chief State Solicitor’s Office and written prosecution directions being received. The Director of Public Prosecutions opposed the application, arguing among other things that it was out of time and that no relevant prejudice had been shown.
The court first extended the time for the judicial review application. It accepted that the applicant had followed a court practice at the time under which delay applications were brought before the Central Criminal Court, and found good reason to extend the deadline after that practice was discontinued.
Quirke J. rejected the claim that the prosecution decision period was excessive or culpable. The court also found, for the purpose of assessing the delay issue and assuming the allegations were true, that the applicant had exercised dominion over the complainant. It concluded that her account of fear, threats, family safety concerns and psychological difficulties adequately explained why she did not report to prosecuting authorities until 1999. The court therefore ruled that the trial would not be prohibited on the basis of her reporting delay.
The applicant said his estranged wife’s death deprived him of evidence central to his defence, and that unidentified people who may have been present during some alleged incidents could no longer be found. The court found the proposed evidence speculative and did not consider its absence sufficient specific prejudice to justify stopping the trial. It said these matters could be addressed at trial by the applicant’s lawyers and the trial judge. The application for relief was refused; the court did not determine the criminal charges.