Judgment: 2008-04-23 · Court archive

Supreme Court rejects appeal over solicitor misconduct complaint

The Court upheld the High Court’s decision that the complaints did not establish a prima facie case for a disciplinary inquiry.

Supreme Court ·

Who, what, where, when and why

Who
  • Brendan O’Reilly (Appellant)
  • Rosario Lee (Respondent)
What

The Court upheld the High Court’s decision that the complaints did not establish a prima facie case for a disciplinary inquiry.

Where

No place detail is included in this summary.

When

Judgment:

Other dates in the report
  • 26 July 2006

    The complaint arose from Lee’s work for O’Reilly’s then-wife in matrimonial proceedings in the Circuit Court. The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal had found on 20 March 2006 that no prima facie case had been established. The High Court dismissed O’Reilly’s appeal on 26 July 2006. The Supreme Court judgment, delivered by Ms Justice Macken on 23 April 2008, concerned his appeal from that High Court decision.

Why

Reasons reported in the judgment

The Supreme Court has rejected Brendan O’Reilly’s appeal against a High Court ruling that his complaints about solicitor Rosario Lee did not establish a prima facie case for a disciplinary inquiry. The Court affirmed the High Court order.

The Supreme Court has rejected Brendan O’Reilly’s appeal against a High Court ruling that his complaints about solicitor Rosario Lee did not establish a prima facie case for a disciplinary inquiry. The Court affirmed the High Court order.

The complaint arose from Lee’s work for O’Reilly’s then-wife in matrimonial proceedings in the Circuit Court. The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal had found on 20 March 2006 that no prima facie case had been established. The High Court dismissed O’Reilly’s appeal on 26 July 2006. The Supreme Court judgment, delivered by Ms Justice Macken on 23 April 2008, concerned his appeal from that High Court decision.

O’Reilly’s complaints included allegations that the proceedings were conducted oppressively, that reports were obtained inappropriately, that his children were examined without his knowledge, and that he received short notice of applications and witnesses. He also complained about discovery, his resignation letter and use of his laptop. He accepted that the High Court had accurately summarised his complaints and said he was not seeking to reopen the Circuit Court decisions.

The Supreme Court explained that an appeal from the Tribunal to the High Court is heard afresh: the parties can make their arguments again, and the High Court independently decides whether a prima facie case exists. The Court said the complaints were fundamentally procedural matters arising in the matrimonial proceedings, which were generally for the trial judge to address. Vigorous litigation did not, by itself, amount to professional misconduct.

The Court noted that conduct such as deliberately misleading a court could potentially justify a disciplinary inquiry. But it found no evidential basis for O’Reilly’s allegation that Lee misled the Circuit Court through a report supplied on the morning of a hearing. The assertion that the court “must have been misled” did not meet the required threshold. The Court also said O’Reilly had not identified particular professional conduct codes and linked them to specific alleged breaches.

O’Reilly also raised bias concerning the High Court President’s statutory role in appointing some Tribunal members. The Supreme Court said the issue was not a ground of appeal and, in any event, the appointment role alone would not give a reasonable person grounds to apprehend an unfair hearing. It rejected the bias allegation.

The Supreme Court rejected the appeal and affirmed the High Court order. It did not direct the Tribunal to hold an inquiry.

Read the original court judgment

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