The Court of Appeal has dismissed William Butler’s appeal over a High Court judge’s refusal to recuse himself, finding that the allegations did not establish objective bias.
The appeal concerned an application under section 33 of the Trustee Act 1893. The High Court had appointed a solicitor to execute a conveyance after a party failed to comply with an existing court order. The Court of Appeal said ownership, obligations and liabilities had already been determined; the application was to give effect to those earlier orders.
Butler’s single ground of appeal was that the High Court judge, Barrett J., should have withdrawn because of objective bias. The appeal did not allege subjective bias. At the hearing, Michael Butler raised Barrett J.’s former employment with the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC), formerly Anglo Irish Bank. Barrett J. said he would not hear matters involving IBRC, but stated that he had no connection with any party to the proceedings.
The Court of Appeal summarised three assertions advanced in support of the bias claim: that the plaintiff had some form of business relationship with Sean FitzPatrick, a former IBRC chief executive; that the plaintiff had given IBRC’s address as an address; and that Barrett J. had previously worked for the bank. The judgment said IBRC had no connection with the action, the parties or the lands involved. It also noted that a judge, Finlay Geoghegan J., had already found Michael Butler had no interest in the lands in suit, though Barrett J. had permitted him to address the court.
Applying principles from the Supreme Court’s decision in *O’Callaghan v. Mahon*, the Court of Appeal said the question was whether a reasonable, fair-minded and informed observer could reasonably apprehend a risk that the decision-maker would not be fair and impartial. The court concluded that the alleged links did not meet that test.
Kelly J. said Barrett J. was correct not to disqualify himself and that the appeal should be dismissed. Irvine J. and Mahon J. agreed. The ruling addressed the recusal issue on this appeal; it did not revisit the earlier determinations about the property or the parties’ obligations.