The High Court upheld an Appeal Commissioner’s determination that a fire-resistant, hygienic door set developed by Wen-Plast (Research and Development) Limited involved “radical innovation” for the purposes of tax legislation.
The Revenue Commissioners had appealed on a point of law under section 141 of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997. They argued that radical innovation had to be found in the process leading to the invention, rather than in the invention or the product resulting from it. The court rejected that interpretation.
The dispute concerned a door set for pharmaceutical clean rooms. The case stated described its inventive aspect as an intumescent fire-resistant strip encased in cured plastic material. Evidence before the Commissioner was that clean rooms had previously required separate doors to meet fire-resistance and hygiene standards. The combined door set provided both qualities. The materials and technologies used were known, but the Commissioner found that their combination produced a new product and a fundamental redesign.
The Revenue’s witness, patent agent and licensing consultant P. Michael Connor, considered the individual elements known and said their combination did not amount to radical innovation. The Commissioner preferred evidence from the company’s witnesses, including specialists in clean-room construction and fire safety.
In a judgment delivered on 9 March 2007, Miss Justice Laffoy held that the statutory phrase referred to the invention, not to radical innovation having to occur earlier in the development process. She said the ordinary meaning was that the invention itself was radically innovative, involving an original and fundamental change. Patentability and radical innovation were distinct questions.
The court also considered whether the Commissioner’s conclusion could stand on the evidence. The applicable test was whether no reasonable decision-maker could have reached that conclusion, rather than whether the High Court itself would have drawn the same inference. The Commissioner’s conclusion was open to him and, on the evidence set out in the case stated, was correct.
The court answered the stated question of law in the affirmative. The judgment resolved that legal question and upheld the Commissioner’s determination on the issue referred; it did not set out a separate order awarding damages or specify a tax amount.