The High Court dismissed a minor’s appeal over her late father’s estate, ruling that farmland he bought jointly with his wife using borrowed funds was not a “disposition” under the Succession Act 1965. The court also held that the claim under section 121 was statute barred.
The judgment, delivered by Ms Justice M. H. Clark on 27 January 2014, concerned proceedings brought by L.C. through her mother and next friend. Her father, W.S., died intestate in October 2005. The respondent was his widow.
The Circuit Court had declared that L.C. was entitled to one sixth of one third of the estate and ordered the widow to administer the estate and pay L.C. €4,004.19. The High Court appeal focused on whether the purchase of a farmhouse and land, referred to in the judgment as location “C”, could be treated as a disposition intended to diminish L.C.’s inheritance.
The High Court found that L.C.’s mother knew by July 2006 that the land had been bought jointly. But the section 121 claim was first raised in separate proceedings in August 2009, more than three years after that knowledge and after the six-month period the court said applied to section 117 and related child claims under section 121. The original proceedings had been brought in time, but the court said they did not include a section 121 claim and were not a basis to suspend the statutory time limit. It held the claim statute barred and said it would be unconscionable to use its inherent jurisdiction to make an order in the circumstances.
The court also considered the nature of the purchase. The land was acquired in 2004 in the spouses’ joint names, financed by a €380,000 loan and a €450,000 private loan from W.S.’s brother. The judgment noted that both spouses had obligations under the loans and that the surviving widow became solely liable for the mortgage after W.S.’s death.
The judge concluded that acquiring property jointly with borrowed funds was not a disposition under section 121. The court was therefore not required to hear evidence about W.S.’s intention when buying the land. It added that, even if the transaction could qualify, the evidence described a sudden, unanticipated death and did not establish a transaction designed to defeat the child’s rights.
The court concluded that L.C. was not entitled to an order under section 121. Without such an order, it said, her father could not be treated as a testator for the purpose of section 117. The judgment did not disturb the Circuit Court’s declaration of her intestate share or its order for payment.