The High Court dismissed a registered teacher’s action seeking to stop the Teaching Council of Ireland from notifying the National Vetting Bureau of a concern under section 19 of the National Vetting Bureau (Children and Vulnerable Persons) Act 2012. Mr Justice Allen delivered judgment on 26 February 2019.
The teacher, identified as M.P., alleged that the Council lacked a bona fide concern and was acting maliciously. He argued that the notification decision came too late and amounted to misfeasance in public office. The Council denied the claims. The case was tried on documents, without oral evidence.
The dispute followed a Teaching Council disciplinary inquiry into complaints arising from M.P.’s conduct as a housemaster at a boarding school. A student told gardaí and school staff that M.P. had tried to remove his tracksuit bottoms after they had been drinking. The student did not make a complaint to gardaí. A second student made other allegations during the school’s internal investigation. These were allegations and evidence before the Council; the High Court judgment did not make findings that the alleged sexual conduct occurred.
The school dismissed M.P. after its disciplinary panel found some allegations of gross misconduct proved. The Teaching Council’s inquiry later narrowed the allegations after the two students declined to participate. The disciplinary panel sought undertakings from M.P. about future situations involving students and alcohol. Separately, the Council had pursued a High Court application for an interim suspension order, but it did not seek that order after the case against M.P. narrowed. He was released from an undertaking not to teach.
The Council’s Evidence of Character Panel considered the section 19 question in June 2018 and decided that it had a bona fide concern to notify. The court rejected the argument that the Council had to notify at the end of each stage of its disciplinary process. It held that the reporting obligation arose when the Council formed a bona fide concern, and found no delay on the evidence. It also held that even if notification had been delayed, that would not remove the Council’s obligation or power to notify later.
The court rejected the allegation of targeted malice and found abundant justification for the Council’s concern. It distinguished notifying the Bureau from any later disclosure: whether information is disclosed is for the Bureau’s statutory process, which includes safeguards and an appeal. The judgment did not decide that the Bureau would disclose information, nor did it determine any later vetting application. The action was dismissed.