The Court of Appeal has dismissed K.C.’s appeal against conviction, finding that the trial judge was entitled to refuse a requested corroboration warning. The judgment dealt only with the conviction appeal; it did not determine K.C.’s separate appeal against the severity of his sentence.
K.C. was convicted on 16 counts of indecent assault after a four-day trial and sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment. The complainant, identified in the judgment as K.C.’s sister, alleged that offences took place between 1983 and 1987, when she was aged between seven and 11. The alleged offences were said to have occurred in the family home. K.C. was aged between 21 and 25 during the period.
At trial, the defence sought a corroboration warning, arguing that there was no independent support for the complainant’s account and pointing to disputes and uncertainties in the evidence. These included when she moved bedrooms, whether she had accounted for a period when K.C. was away from the home, and differing accounts of other events. The prosecution accepted there was no corroboration in the relevant sense but argued that the warning was a matter for the trial judge’s discretion. The judge declined to give it, while telling the jury there was no corroboration and that the complainant’s evidence was central to their assessment.
On appeal, K.C. argued that the trial judge had applied the wrong legal test by referring to whether the case was “exceptional”, and that the combination of issues in the evidence required a warning. The Court of Appeal said the trial judge’s decision could be overturned only if it rested on an incorrect legal basis or was clearly wrong in fact.
The appeal court concluded that the judge’s reference to there being nothing exceptional did not impose a threshold beyond the law. It understood the judge to be saying that warnings should not be given routinely and that the evidence did not require one. The court also said the evidence did not establish that the complainant was unreliable, had lied, had made false complaints, or bore a grudge against K.C. It found that the matters raised did not make a warning mandatory or leave only one possible exercise of discretion.
The court held that the trial judge had acted within his discretion and dismissed the conviction appeal. The judgment records that a delay warning had been given at trial and was not at issue on appeal.