The High Court has ruled that a District Court lacked jurisdiction to deal with a defendant’s suspended sentences after he was remanded for a week instead of to the next sitting of the court, as required by law.
In a judgment delivered on 21 March 2014, Ms Justice Iseult O’Malley answered a consultative case stated by District Judge Ann Watkin. The case concerned section 99 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006, which sets out steps for dealing with a suspended sentence when a person is convicted of another offence during the suspension period.
Jeffrey Carter had received sentences from Judge Watkin in January 2011: four months’ imprisonment, with the final three months suspended for 12 months, and a further six-month sentence suspended in full for two years. He committed two further offences on 11 March 2011. After pleading guilty to those offences in the Circuit Court on 23 January 2012, he was remanded for sentence.
At the sentencing hearing, the Circuit Court was told that the offences had been committed while the suspended sentences were in force. It remanded Carter to a District Court sitting one week later. Neither side objected at the time. When the matter came before District Judge McNamara, the defence argued that the remand did not comply with the requirement to send Carter to the “next sitting”. McNamara remanded him onward to Judge Watkin, who later found that the week-long remand was invalid but that Carter had waived the requirement by not objecting.
Judge Watkin referred four questions to the High Court. The parties agreed that, in the Dublin Metropolitan District, “next sitting” meant the next day on which the District Court sat, and that the sitting did not have to be before the judge who imposed the original sentence.
Justice O’Malley held that the statutory requirement was mandatory. She said it applied both to defendants in custody and those on bail, and rejected the prosecution’s argument that a “reasonable” remand period could be allowed.
The judge then held that the District Court’s power to deal with a suspended sentence under section 99(10) depended on a valid remand under section 99(9). Following the Court of Criminal Appeal’s decision in People (DPP) v Devine, she concluded that the required statutory foundation had not been laid and that the District Court had no jurisdiction to deal with Carter’s case.
The High Court answered “yes” to the first two questions: the remand had to be to the next sitting, and failure to comply deprived the court of jurisdiction. It said the questions about waiver did not arise and answered “no” to whether consent could be implied from failure to object. The judgment did not itself determine whether the suspended sentences should be activated.