The High Court refused an application to stop a summary motoring prosecution, ruling that the judicial review was premature while the District Court had yet to decide whether to dismiss the charge.
In a judgment delivered on 3 March 2005, Mrs Justice Macken said the accused had sought judicial review during an ongoing trial, after the prosecution case had concluded but before the District Court justice ruled on the dismissal application. She refused the requested prohibition and injunction.
The charge concerned an allegation that Desmond Kiernan drove with more than the permitted amount of alcohol in his system on 29 October 2000. The prosecution case was heard on 23 January 2002. Kiernan’s solicitor then sought a direction dismissing the charge. The District Court requested written submissions, which the parties exchanged over the following months. No ruling had been made by the time the judicial review began in 2004.
Kiernan argued that the delays were excessive and risked impairing his ability to defend himself, including his ability to recall prosecution evidence. The Director of Public Prosecutions disputed that account, saying many adjournments were sought by the defence or resulted from circumstances beyond either party’s control. The judge said responsibility for some adjournments was disputed, while others arose because of weather, illness, court availability or agreed time for submissions. She did not decide each dispute over the chronology.
Macken accepted that a criminal trial, including a summary trial, should proceed with reasonable expedition. But she said judicial review during a trial was available only in very rare and exceptional circumstances, and that most challenges should wait until the trial has concluded. She distinguished this case from earlier proceedings in which review had been allowed: here, evidence had been heard, the application came mid-trial, and the issue did not have the exceptional character of the earlier case.
The judge also found that the claimed prejudice depended on what the District Court would decide. Because no ruling had yet been given, she said it was speculative to assume that the dismissal application would fail or that prejudice would arise. She held the challenge premature and, as a quia timet application seeking relief against an anticipated future event, unavailable on the authorities she considered.
The High Court refused the relief sought. It did not decide the underlying charge or the pending application to dismiss it; those remained before the District Court.