The High Court has refused the respondents’ application for a certificate allowing an appeal over its earlier decision to quash an asylum appeal ruling and remit the case for a fresh determination.
Mr Justice Robert Eagar delivered the judgment on 21 May 2015 in judicial review proceedings brought by M.O.S.H (Pakistan). The respondents were the Refugee Appeals Tribunal, the Minister for Justice and Equality, the Attorney General and Ireland.
On 27 March 2015, the court had quashed the Tribunal’s decision affirming the Refugee Applications Commissioner’s recommendation. It ordered that the applicant’s appeal be sent back for a determination de novo by a separate member of the Tribunal.
The respondents then sought a certificate under section 5(3)(a) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000. They proposed asking whether the court’s interpretation of rationality in assessing credibility accorded with the test in State (Keegan) v Stardust Victims Compensation Tribunal and later High Court cases. The applicant opposed the request, arguing that the judgment applied established administrative law principles, including rationality and reasonableness.
Justice Eagar set out the requirements for a certificate, including that the proposed point must be one of exceptional public importance, that the law must be genuinely uncertain, and that an appeal must be desirable in the public interest. These are cumulative requirements, and the point must arise from the court’s decision and extend beyond the facts of the individual case.
The judgment reviewed earlier decisions concerning credibility findings in asylum cases. It noted principles that credibility must be assessed against the available evidence as a whole, on correct facts and without speculation, with reasons connected to the substance of the claim. It also referred to judicial review grounds including unfair procedures, unreasonableness and excess of jurisdiction.
The court concluded that its judgment contained no novel point of law and refused the certificate. The ruling concerned only permission to appeal; it did not reverse the earlier quashing order or the direction for a fresh determination.