Judgment: 2021-12-15 · Court archive

High Court restrains Mater from ending surgeon’s practising privileges under disputed notice

The interlocutory ruling found a strong case that the termination process may breach the Mater’s 2020 constitution. The court did not decide the underlying dispute or bar the hospital from starting a proper disciplinary process.

High Court · [2021] IEHC 850; [2021 5729 P]

Who, what, where, when and why

Who
  • Gregory Heffernan (Plaintiff)
  • Mater Private (Defendant)
What

The interlocutory ruling found a strong case that the termination process may breach the Mater’s 2020 constitution. The court did not decide the underlying dispute or bar the hospital from starting a proper disciplinary process.

Where

Places mentioned in the report

  • Mater Private Hospital Cork
  • Cork
When

Judgment:

Why

Reasons reported in the judgment

The High Court has restrained the Mater Private Hospital Cork from giving effect to a notice terminating an orthopaedic surgeon’s practising privileges, pending the trial of his action. In an interlocutory ruling, Ms Justice Egan found that Gregory Heffernan had made out a strong case that the notice may breach the 2020 Medical Society Constitution and that the balance of justice favoured interim relief.

The High Court has restrained the Mater Private Hospital Cork from giving effect to a notice terminating an orthopaedic surgeon’s practising privileges, pending the trial of his action. In an interlocutory ruling, Ms Justice Egan found that Gregory Heffernan had made out a strong case that the notice may breach the 2020 Medical Society Constitution and that the balance of justice favoured interim relief.

The judge did not decide whether the Mater was ultimately entitled to end the contractual relationship, or whether the surgeon’s conduct justified disciplinary action. The court heard the parties on the orders and costs the day after judgment, but the source does not record the resulting formal order.

The Mater issued the notice on 7 July 2021, giving six months’ notice to withdraw Mr Heffernan’s practising privileges. The notice cited his response to the hospital’s withdrawal of nursing support from his weekly clinic, including a letter to patients saying the clinic had been cancelled and inviting complaints to hospital management. The Mater alleged that the letter blamed and disparaged management, and said he had failed to attend a meeting. Mr Heffernan disputed the hospital’s handling of nursing support. The judge said the parties’ disagreements about that issue did not need to be resolved for the interlocutory application.

Mr Heffernan argued that the notice was, in substance, a conduct-based termination and that the procedures in the 2020 Constitution had not been followed. Those procedures provide for consultation with the chair of the Medical Advisory Committee and opportunities for the consultant to make representations, with an appeal to the Mater board. None of those steps had occurred.

The judge found a strong case that the 2020 Constitution governed the relationship, despite being unsigned, and that its provisions may rule out termination on reasonable notice outside the specified routes. She also found that the notice itself referred to the surgeon’s conduct, supporting the inference that it was conduct-based. The ruling applied the higher “strong case” threshold for interim relief, without finally determining any of these issues.

In weighing the competing risks, the judge considered that damages might not adequately address the professional reputational harm if privileges were terminated prematurely. The Mater had not identified a particular difficulty or financial loss from continuing theatre access. The judge said the hospital remained free to begin the disciplinary process under the constitution or decide not to renew privileges at a future three-year renewal point. She stressed that the renewal date was not established in the evidence and did not decide when it would arise.

The judgment directed that the case proceed to trial without delay. It did not resolve the parties’ underlying contractual claims or the merits of any future disciplinary decision.

Read the original court judgment

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