The Supreme Court dismissed P.O’C’s appeal, ruling that the Central Criminal Court could not hear a separate application at the start of a trial to stay or quash an indictment on grounds of delay. The appropriate pre-trial route, it said, was to apply to the High Court for leave to seek judicial review.
The appeal concerned a certified question about a trial judge’s jurisdiction under the Constitution or common law. P.O’C had been convicted in 2000 of five counts of indecent assault and found not guilty of the remaining matters. The alleged offences were said to have occurred between 1979 and 1981. The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed his appeal in 2003 and certified the point of law for the Supreme Court.
At the 2000 trial, after a first jury was discharged because two members knew witnesses, a new jury was sworn. The defence then sought a stay, arguing that the delay meant P.O’C could not receive a fair trial. The trial judge refused the application, saying he lacked jurisdiction to decide it as a preliminary matter, but that delay and any prejudice could be considered during the trial. P.O’C was later sentenced to four years’ imprisonment, with one year suspended.
The Supreme Court held that a motion to quash an indictment is generally limited to defects in the indictment itself, such as a charge that discloses no offence or falls outside the court’s jurisdiction. A delay claim requires consideration of facts, including whether the accused suffered prejudice, and the Court said judicial review provides the appropriate procedure for that inquiry before trial.
The Court also rejected reliance on an earlier Central Criminal Court decision that had considered a delay challenge through a motion to quash. It held that decision was wrong in law and should not be followed.
The ruling did not remove the trial court’s continuing duty to ensure a fair trial. The Supreme Court said a trial judge may act during the trial if evidence or other matters show that delay has made the proceedings unfair. That power does not extend to a separate preliminary hearing on delay at the commencement of the trial.