The High Court refused an application by E.K.K., identified in the judgment as being from the Democratic Republic of Congo, for a certificate allowing an appeal to the Court of Appeal. The application concerned the court’s earlier refusal to overturn a Refugee Appeals Tribunal decision upholding the refusal of refugee status.
The court said the earlier decision rested on the Imafu principles, under which a fundamental lack of credibility can remove the decision-maker’s obligation to consider country-of-origin information, and on failures to comply with rules governing affidavits sworn by a person who lacks sufficient fluency in an official language of the State.
The applicant argued that differing High Court approaches to the Imafu principles raised a point of exceptional public importance. She also contended that the affidavit rules should have been disapplied to avoid a breach of EU law, including Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and that the court’s approach conflicted with an earlier ruling on procedural non-compliance.
The respondents disputed that the issues met the statutory threshold for an appeal certificate. They said the affidavit rules supported fair proceedings by ensuring the deponent’s evidence was accurately presented. They also told the court that they had warned the applicant’s solicitors about the affidavit defects before the first hearing.
In refusing the certificate, the court said the applicant had received those communications and had not remedied the defects. It concluded that the failure to comply with the rules was active and conscious, rather than inadvertent human error, and distinguished the earlier ruling relied on by the applicant.
The judge also rejected the claim that the law on the Imafu principles was uncertain, finding that the earlier decision followed an established line of authority. The judgment noted that the court had heard and determined the substantive case despite making a technical order concerning the affidavit. The applicant had failed on the substantive ground, and the technical order had been made partly to guide future practice.
The certificate was refused on each ground. The ruling concerned leave to appeal; it did not grant the applicant refugee status or reverse the earlier refusal of substantive relief.