The Supreme Court prohibited the prosecution of an anonymised appellant, T. S., after finding that the very extreme delay in the case was unexplained.
In a judgment delivered on 22 June 2005, Mr Justice Fennelly said he agreed with the conclusion of Mr Justice McCracken that the respondents’ explanations for the delay were insufficient. The consequence, he said, was that the delay remained unexplained and the appellant was entitled to an order of prohibition on that ground alone.
Justice Fennelly also discussed the legal questions raised by prosecutions delayed for sexual abuse. He said the case law did not clearly establish that the passage of time alone could never justify prohibiting a trial. He noted differing interpretations of earlier decisions, including a December 2004 case, and said the issue required further elaboration.
The judgment described one interpretation as a “special jurisprudence” in child sexual abuse cases, where delay in complaining might be attributed to an accused because of dominance or psychological inhibition. Justice Fennelly said he continued to hold that view, while acknowledging that another judge had disagreed.
He said it was sufficient to resolve the present case that the explanations offered for the extreme delay were inadequate. The order of prohibition stopped the prosecution from proceeding. The judgment does not identify the appellant or specify the underlying alleged offence beyond its discussion of delayed prosecutions for sexual abuse.