Judgment: 2019-02-11 · Court archive

Minister ordered to pay costs in first naturalisation review; no costs order in second

The High Court ruled on costs after granting limited substantive relief in two related judicial reviews concerning a naturalisation certificate.

High Court · [2019] IEHC 93

Who, what, where, when and why

Who
  • The Minister for Justice and Equality (Respondent)
  • Richard Humphreys (Judge)
What

The High Court ruled on costs after granting limited substantive relief in two related judicial reviews concerning a naturalisation certificate.

Where

No place detail is included in this summary.

When

Judgment:

Why

Reasons reported in the judgment

The second review presented factors on both sides. The respondents had succeeded on the formal relief and the judge noted that sweeping allegations against the Department had not been established. He also credited the applicant’s counsel with drawing back from more inflammatory allegations during cross-examination. The judge said the criticisms of the Department had been firmly rejected in the earlier judgment.

The High Court ordered the Minister for Justice and Equality to pay the applicant’s costs in the first of two related judicial reviews concerning her certificate of naturalisation. In the second case, the court made no order as to costs.

Mr Justice Richard Humphreys gave the costs judgment on 11 February 2019, after deciding the substance of both cases in an earlier judgment. That earlier order required the Minister to consider, if appropriate in light of a committee of inquiry report, whether the applicant’s certificate should be amended.

The costs judgment recounts how the second review arose. The applicant received leave for the first review in February 2017. After the Minister indicated in June 2017 an intention to revoke her certificate, the respondents argued that the first case had become moot. The applicant proposed amending her grounds to challenge that decision, but the respondents declined to consent. The judge said the applicant’s choice not to proceed with a formal amendment was reasonable in the circumstances, while noting that she had formally made that choice herself. The result was two sets of proceedings rather than one.

For the first review, the judge applied the principle that costs follow the event. The applicant had obtained substantive relief, though less than she originally sought, and the case was not so complex as to justify a different approach. He also noted that a possible declaration about her date of birth had been overtaken by the revocation process. He ordered the respondents to pay the first case’s costs, including reserved costs, to be taxed if the parties could not agree.

The second review presented factors on both sides. The respondents had succeeded on the formal relief and the judge noted that sweeping allegations against the Department had not been established. He also credited the applicant’s counsel with drawing back from more inflammatory allegations during cross-examination. The judge said the criticisms of the Department had been firmly rejected in the earlier judgment.

However, he considered that the respondents had not been particularly facilitative of the proposed amendment, and that evidence in the second case had also informed the issue on which the applicant obtained relief in the first. Weighing the factors together, he made no order as to costs in the second review.

The judge declined a request to leave the first proceedings open generally for possible further relief. He ordered that the orders be perfected, while retaining seisin so the applicant could apply to him about any further application arising from the same subject matter.

Read the original court judgment

Something looks wrong?

Highlight the relevant passage or flag this article for review. Review requests do not immediately change the report.

Email a correction request

Request a review