The High Court ruled that a plaintiff in a defamation case may have damages assessed by a jury after accepting an offer to make amends, if he wishes. The decision addresses the mode of assessment under the statutory process; it does not determine the amount of damages or costs, or settle the outstanding terms of the offer.
Padraig Higgins sued the Irish Aviation Authority over three emails sent in June and July 2013 by an IAA member to other IAA officers and a member of the UK Civil Aviation Authority. His claim was limited to those publications.
The Authority made an unqualified offer to make amends in May 2015, which Higgins accepted the following month. The offer included money, proposed wording for an apology and its circulation, and legal costs to date. The parties could not agree on the offer’s terms. Higgins then applied for directions under section 23 of the Defamation Act 2009, including whether a jury could assess damages and compensation and consider the adequacy of measures taken to comply with the offer.
The Authority argued that a judge sitting alone should determine any damages and costs. It said the offer-to-make-amends procedure was intended to resolve cases efficiently, and that the Act expressly identifies a jury in other provisions dealing with damages but not in section 23.
Higgins argued that the longstanding jury role in High Court defamation cases remained in place. He relied in part on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Lennon v Health Service Executive, which held that a plaintiff’s right to a jury in a defamation action could not be diluted by case-management orders.
Justice Moriarty said Lennon was binding and provided the starting point for interpreting section 23. The judge noted that the 2009 Act expressly provides for certain preliminary matters to be decided without a jury, but contains no equivalent exclusion for the assessment under section 23. The judge also contrasted the Irish provision with the UK legislation, which expressly requires the offer-to-make-amends procedure to operate without a jury.
The court held that Higgins was entitled under section 23(1)(c) to have his damages assessed by a jury rather than a judge alone, should he wish to do so. The ruling settled that entitlement. The judgment did not assess damages or costs, decide the adequacy of the Authority’s compliance measures, or resolve the disputed offer terms.