The High Court rejected five objections by Stephen O’Sullivan to a UK request to pursue an alleged bail offence, and said it was “disposed to grant” consent. The judgment’s conclusion does not record a formal order granting consent.
The request concerns an allegation that O’Sullivan failed to surrender to bail on 13 March 2009, when a jury was deliberating in his trial at Luton Crown Court. The allegation is not a finding that he committed the offence. It was not among the offences covered by the European Arrest Warrant under which he was surrendered to the UK in June 2010.
O’Sullivan had been sentenced in his absence to six and a half years’ imprisonment on six offences. The bail allegation was mentioned in the warrant, including a reference to the trial judge’s indication that a consecutive sentence might be imposed if O’Sullivan were arrested. In February 2010, before surrender, the High Court had rejected an argument that those references showed the UK would breach the rule of specialty. It held that the UK would need to seek the Irish court’s consent before prosecuting or punishing him for the separate offence.
The present request was made in a letter dated 29 November 2010 from Judge Bright, a Crown Court judge who had presided over O’Sullivan’s trial. The letter sought permission for the Crown Court to consider the alleged failure to surrender to bail. It said that, if consent were given, O’Sullivan could admit or contest the allegation; if contested, it would have to be proved to the criminal standard. Those were descriptions of proposed UK proceedings, not findings by the Irish court.
O’Sullivan challenged the process, arguing that the request was not properly initiated, was not shown to come from the issuing state, relied on inadmissible hearsay, lacked an explanation for the judge’s role, and breached a legitimate expectation that the bail offence would not be pursued because it was left out of the warrant.
The High Court rejected each objection. It found no originating process was required for the request, accepted the letter as a valid written request on behalf of the issuing state, and held that the hearsay rule did not prevent it from receiving or considering the request. It also found no basis to infer that Judge Bright lacked authority or had prejudged the issue. On legitimate expectation, the court noted the absence of evidence supporting such an expectation and that the statutory consent procedure expressly covers offences committed before surrender.
The court concluded that the alleged offence was not one for which surrender would be barred under the relevant legislation or Framework Decision. It said it was therefore disposed to grant consent. The judgment does not set out a separate operative order or confirm that consent was formally granted.