The High Court refused an application by six Quinn plaintiffs to amend their statement of claim in a long-running dispute with Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC) and Kieran Wallace over loans and security provided to Anglo Irish Bank. The decision gave reasons for an order made on 13 May 2015, shortly before the main trial was due to begin on 3 June.
The plaintiffs’ case concerns lending to Quinn Group companies, particularly in 2007 and 2008. They challenge six share charges and personal guarantees connected with lending to six Cypriot companies. Their existing pleadings alleged, among other things, undue influence, unconscionable bargains and breaches of company and market-abuse rules.
A Supreme Court ruling in March 2015 had held that, on the case pleaded and argued to that point, the plaintiffs could not rely on alleged breaches of section 60 of the Companies Act 1963 or the Market Abuse Regulations to challenge the security. The Supreme Court said a separate argument that the security might be unenforceable even if the underlying loans remained enforceable had not been made, and left that question open.
The plaintiffs then sought to add that “stand alone” argument, claiming they had provided the security innocently and that it was unenforceable independently of the loans. They also proposed a new plea that the lending and security were unlawful at common law because they served an illegal purpose. The defendants opposed the changes, arguing that the application came too late and would circumvent the earlier ruling.
Mr Justice Haughton rejected the defendants’ claim that the proposed “stand alone” issue had already been decided by the Supreme Court. But he refused the amendments as an exercise of the court’s discretion, finding that the arguments should have been raised earlier. He noted that the defendants had identified the omission in written submissions in May 2012, and that the plaintiffs gave no explanation for not seeking amendment then or at the outset.
The judge considered the case management and resources already spent on a preliminary issue and appeal, as well as the risk that allowing the amendments would recast arguments after that process. He did not regard the practical delay that amendments might cause as significant on its own. The proposed common-law plea also relied on the offence of “cheating the public”; the judge accepted that the offence had been abolished, and refused the amendment. A separate tort-based argument had been raised only in a late rejoinder and was also rejected as impermissible.
The ruling concerned permission to amend the pleadings. It did not determine the underlying trial claims or decide the merits of the proposed “stand alone” argument. The judgment records that the main trial was listed for 3 June 2015.