The Court of Appeal has dismissed P.P.’s appeal against his conviction for indecent assault, finding that the trial judge’s directions on proof beyond reasonable doubt did not lead the jury to confuse criminal and civil standards.
P.P. was tried on two counts concerning his niece. He was acquitted on a count alleging indecent assault between August 1982 and January 1985, and convicted on a second count relating to an alleged incident in January 1985, when the complainant was nine. The judgment says P.P. was babysitting her and that she later told her father about the assault. A formal complaint was made in 2012.
The appeal focused on the trial judge’s answer to jury questions during deliberations. The jury asked for clarification about reasonable doubt and how much higher the criminal standard was than the balance of probabilities. In response, the judge said a person could not be convicted unless the jury was convinced by the evidence. He also referred to a “50/50 situation”, saying the accused should receive the benefit of the doubt and that the criminal standard was much higher than the civil standard.
After counsel raised concerns about the “50/50” reference, the judge gave a further direction drawing on *The People (DPP) v Cahill*. He distinguished the civil standard, described in the recharge as just over 50%, from the criminal requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
For P.P., counsel argued that the jury’s question showed it was considering the case in percentage terms and that the answer risked further confusion. The prosecution submitted that the full charge correctly explained the applicable principles.
The Court of Appeal assessed the charge as a whole. It said the initial directions on the presumption of innocence, burden of proof and criminal standard were “beyond reproach”. Although it said the “50/50” wording was best avoided, the court concluded that the judge repeatedly told the jury the criminal standard was higher and that the accused must receive the benefit of any doubt. It was not persuaded that the jury had conflated the two standards. The court also noted that the jury had acquitted P.P. on one count.
The court dismissed the appeal. The judgment deals with the conviction appeal and the adequacy of the jury directions; it does not alter the jury’s verdicts.