The High Court allowed Breffini and Laura Morgan’s application to add Ruxton Architectural Services Limited as a defendant to their claim concerning a house. It did not decide whether the claim against the company was statute-barred; that issue may arise at trial.
The ex tempore judgment was delivered by Mr Justice Tony O’Connor on 10 March 2016. The application was made under Order 15, rule 13 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and was strenuously opposed by the second defendant, Patrick Ruxton, who trades as Patrick Ruxton Architectural Services.
The judgment records that the plaintiffs referred to buying the house in August 2006 and to plaster falling off. Their plenary summons was issued on 25 July 2012. The court also noted that the plaintiffs’ solicitors received an undated letter from Ruxton on 30 June 2011 in response to a letter of claim. The judgment says that letter did not specifically alert the solicitors that Ruxton would assert that he had certified the work and carried out other relevant acts through his limited liability company. An insurance certificate dated 12 December 2005, which the plaintiffs said was relevant, named Ruxton rather than the company.
Ruxton argued on behalf of the proposed defendant that the claim would be statute-barred and that this was manifest. The court said factual and opinion disputes could not be resolved on affidavit evidence alone at this stage, and that it had to take the plaintiffs’ submissions at their height. It referred to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Brandley v. Keane, which confirmed that a cause of action does not arise until loss or damage has been sustained.
The judge said the disputed issues and the possibility that the plaintiffs might plead concealment of the company’s identity under section 71 of the Statute of Limitations Act 1957 meant the court could not determine the issue of conscionability on this application. Whether there had been an honest blunder or concealment could be an issue at trial. The company was not before the court to make a preliminary issue application.
The court directed Ruxton, the second defendant, to pay the costs of the application, with execution stayed until the proceedings are determined. No special cause to depart from the usual costs rule had been identified.