The Supreme Court has referred a dispute over rental charges for Ryanair’s check-in desks at Dublin Airport to the Court of Justice of the European Communities, leaving that part of the appeal unresolved pending a European ruling.
In a judgment delivered on 13 March 2003, Chief Justice Keane and Justices Denham and Murray considered Ryanair Limited’s appeal against a High Court decision refusing judicial review relief against Aer Rianta CPT. The appeal concerned charges and rules applying to Ryanair’s airport operations. In oral argument, Ryanair pursued three issues.
The Supreme Court dismissed the challenge to a £2,000 administration charge. Aer Rianta said the charge was intended to cover additional costs arising after the ground handling market was deregulated, including oversight of insurance, staffing, equipment and compliance with airport standards. Ryanair argued that a statutory body could impose only charges expressly authorised by legislation. The court held that Aer Rianta was a trading company required to operate commercially and was entitled to recover the additional expenses described in the undisputed evidence.
The court also rejected Ryanair’s challenge to Aer Rianta’s Rules of Conduct. Ryanair argued that the rules were adopted without proper consultation with affected airport users. The court found that a draft had been circulated with an invitation to comment, and that the High Court judge was entitled to find there had been consultation. It added that there was no legal obligation to consult in advance on rules of this kind. This disposed of the ground of appeal pursued in the Supreme Court; the judgment noted that other objections had been raised in the High Court.
The remaining issue concerns £12,000 annual rent for Ryanair’s exclusive use of check-in desks. Ryanair argued that the rent was a fee for access to airport installations under Regulation 14(3) of the 1998 Regulations and therefore required the Minister’s prior approval, which Aer Rianta accepted it had not obtained. Aer Rianta argued that desk allocation and rental fell under a different part of the regulation and did not require that approval.
The Supreme Court was not satisfied that the correct interpretation was beyond reasonable doubt. It decided to request a preliminary ruling from the European court on the construction of Regulation 14. The parties were directed to submit an agreed draft of the question for the Supreme Court’s approval. The further hearing of the appeal was adjourned so the reference could be prepared; the Supreme Court did not decide whether the rent required ministerial approval.