The High Court dismissed Jonathan Finnegan’s challenge to his conviction for refusing to provide breath specimens, holding that the prosecution did not have to prove he had been driving to establish the refusal offence. Judge Maureen H. Clark answered yes to both questions put by the District Court judge in a case stated appeal.
Finnegan had been convicted in January 2007 after refusing a Garda requirement to provide two breath specimens at Terenure Garda Station. The requirement followed his arrest on suspicion of drink-driving on 23 July 2006. He said he had not been driving and that his girlfriend, Lucille Collins, had driven him. Collins and Finnegan’s niece gave evidence supporting that account. The District Court judge said he had a doubt about whether Finnegan was driving, but did not find that he was not.
The appeal raised whether the breath-test requirement was lawfully made and whether Finnegan could rely on a statutory defence based on a special and substantial reason for refusing. He argued that the arrest was unlawful because the arresting Garda had no rational basis to believe he was driving, and that the prosecution had to prove driving for the refusal charge.
Judge Clark declined to assess the arresting Garda’s opinion in the case stated appeal. The lawfulness and reasonableness of the arrest had not been argued at trial, and the District Court’s questions did not ask the High Court to decide that issue. The court therefore considered the questions against the agreed facts and the District Court judge’s doubt about driving.
The judgment distinguished a drink-driving charge, which requires proof of driving, from the separate offence of refusing a breath-test requirement. It held that, following a lawful arrest under the relevant road traffic provisions, proof of actual driving was not a prerequisite to conviction for refusing the station requirement. The judgment also said the statutory defence required a special and substantial reason and that, as soon as practicable, the person must comply with or offer to comply with a requirement for a blood or urine specimen. Finnegan’s belief that he had not been driving did not by itself satisfy that defence.
The High Court answered both questions yes: the District Court judge was correct that the requirement was lawfully made and that the statutory defence was not open to Finnegan. The ruling addressed those questions on the agreed facts; it did not determine the separate challenge to the arrest’s lawfulness.