The Supreme Court has allowed Ian Gillen’s appeal against the continuation of disciplinary proceedings, ruling that Garda authorities breached regulations by waiting more than four years to begin an investigation into alleged conduct in October 1999.
The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice William McKechnie on 26 January 2012, concerned three allegations: that Garda Gillen failed to bring Sarah Murray home at an agreed time; drove her and two others after consuming alcohol; and urinated on a tree near the scene where Raonaid Murray had been murdered. Gillen denied the charges. The murder remained unresolved and the investigation was ongoing, the judgment said.
The allegations arose after Gillen, who was assigned as a liaison officer to the Murray family following the murder, took Sarah Murray and two companions out on 15 October 1999. A senior Garda officer was told about the first two alleged breaches the next day and removed Gillen from the liaison role. The family initially reserved the right to make a formal complaint later.
The family made a written complaint to Gardaí in November 2002 and complained to the Garda Síochána Complaints Board in July 2003. The Board declared that complaint inadmissible in March 2004 because it was outside the six-month time limit. A disciplinary investigation under the Garda Síochána (Discipline) Regulations 1989 was appointed on 4 May 2004. In January 2005, the appointing officer decided to continue proceedings, and Gillen was served with the disciplinary form.
The Supreme Court found that relevant evidence and witnesses were available to Gardaí by 17 October 1999. It rejected the Commissioner’s explanations for not starting the disciplinary process sooner, including the family’s wish to reserve a complaint and the absence of a written complaint. The court said the regulations did not make the disciplinary process dependent on a public complaint.
The court held that the investigation had not been begun “as soon as practicable”, as required by Regulation 8. It treated that requirement as mandatory: the breach could not be excused, and further disciplinary proceedings could not continue. The court also ruled that Gillen had acted promptly in seeking judicial review after learning that the appointing officer had decided to proceed.
The appeal was allowed. The judgment did not determine whether the alleged conduct occurred; it addressed the legality of continuing the disciplinary process after the delay.