The High Court set aside the purported service of a personal injury summons on Robyn Fenty, also known as Rihanna, after finding it was not valid under US federal or New York rules. It then declared the service actually effected sufficient under Order 9, rule 15 of the Rules of the Superior Courts.
The judgment, delivered by Ms Justice O’Regan on 5 July 2018, dealt with a motion by Fenty to set aside service. The plaintiff, Dana Kavanagh, also asked the court to deem service good. Fenty challenged service only; the judgment says the issue of Irish court jurisdiction had fallen away.
The parties agreed that service abroad had to comply with the applicable US federal or New York rules, in the context of the Hague Convention. The affidavits describing service contained conflicting dates and accounts of whether documents had been sent by certified post. Sarah Francus, identified in the judgment as Fenty’s manager, said she received only one set of papers through a concierge on or about 27 October 2016, and not by post.
Justice O’Regan found that the plaintiff had not resolved the discrepancies in the process server’s affidavits. She was not satisfied that the concierge or Francus was authorised to receive service under federal rules, or that service met New York’s requirements. She also rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on service attempts in 2015, before the summons issued, to cure deficiencies in the later service. The defendant had therefore discharged the burden of showing there had been no valid service under either set of US rules.
The court nevertheless considered the plaintiff’s request under Order 9, rule 15, which allows service actually effected to be declared sufficient on just grounds. The judge held that this discretion applied whether or not the defendant was an Irish citizen and that alternative service could be permitted even in a Hague Convention case.
In granting that relief, the judge noted evidence that the documents had come to Fenty’s attention in October 2016, that the plaintiff had attempted to comply with the convention, and that personal service at the residence was not practically available. The court therefore set aside the purported service but declared the service actually effected sufficient. The judgment does not state that the underlying personal injury claim was determined.