The High Court has confirmed that its October 2008 order quashing a Docklands development certificate rendered the certificate null and void ab initio from the date of that judgment. It did not decide whether development carried out before then remained exempt from planning requirements.
In a supplementary ruling delivered on 20 January 2009, Ms Justice Finlay Geoghegan said she would not vary or add to the relief set out in her earlier judgment. The further hearing was held to clarify the order’s meaning after the parties disputed its temporal effect. The judge said she would not reopen issues already decided or address new issues in these proceedings.
The applicants, North Wall Quay Property Holding Company Ltd. and Sean Dunne, had sought judicial review of the Dublin Docklands Development Authority’s decision on 13 July 2007 to grant certificate DD457 to notice party North Quay Investments Ltd. The certificate was issued under section 25(7) of the Dublin Docklands Development Authority Act 1997. In October 2008, the court held the decision ultra vires and indicated it would quash the decision and declare an agreement between the authority and the notice party ultra vires.
The respondent and notice party later sought relief that would limit the order’s temporal effect. The judge accepted the applicants’ submission that this was different from certiorari and that, after delivering judgment and setting out the relief, she had no jurisdiction in these proceedings to grant additional or different relief that would limit certiorari’s normal effect.
The judge summarised the legal position as follows: the authority’s decision was presumed lawful until the court declared it invalid on 9 October 2008; on that date, the order rendered the 2007 decision null and void ab initio; and the certificate was likewise rendered null and void ab initio.
The notice party had carried out development before 9 October 2008 which it contended was in accordance with the certificate. The applicants disputed that and had brought separate proceedings under section 160 of the Planning and Development Act 2000. Justice Geoghegan said the status of that development was a distinct issue for those proceedings and expressed no view on it.
On costs, the applicants were entitled to their costs against the respondent, which accepted that position. The court made no order for costs between the respondent and the notice party, finding both had failed in their respective legal positions in these proceedings.