The High Court dismissed Sean Corrigan’s defamation proceedings over an email sent by solicitor Emma Brennan to him and copied to the Supreme Court office, ruling that the message was not reasonably capable of having a defamatory meaning and that qualified privilege applied.
Mr Justice Robert Eagar gave judgment on 26 July 2017 on the defendant’s motion to dismiss. He held that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action and dismissed the case under Order 19, rule 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and section 34(2) of the Defamation Act 2009. The judgment also found that the requirements for qualified privilege under section 18(2) were met. The extract ends during the court’s further ruling on that defence, so it does not establish whether any additional order was made.
The dispute arose from a long-running appeal concerning the will of Mr Corrigan’s late father. In November 2015, as arrangements were being made for the appeal hearing, Mr Corrigan told the Supreme Court office that there was uncertainty about the whereabouts of the second respondent’s book of pleadings. Ms Brennan replied that her firm had not been served with the appeal book and asked for it to be sent.
Mr Corrigan claimed the email conveyed defamatory imputations, including that he was dishonest, misleading the court, unfit as an appellant and unfit in his profession. He argued that the message had publicly discredited and humiliated him. Those were his pleaded allegations; the court did not accept that the email carried the claimed meanings.
The parties disputed what had been sent in 2008 by Mr Corrigan’s former solicitors. Mr Corrigan relied on his former solicitor’s 2015 account that a copy booklet of appeal had been sent. The defendant’s evidence included correspondence from May 2008 requesting a complete set of pleadings and later promising a fully paginated booklet. The court found that the May 2008 material sent to the defendant’s solicitors was an index, not a book of appeal.
The judge described Ms Brennan’s email as terse, but said it conveyed a disagreement about who had which documents, not that Mr Corrigan was lying, dishonest or unprofessional. The court also concluded that the Supreme Court office had an interest in receiving the information, and that the defendant had a corresponding interest in communicating it. The judgment states that the plaintiff had to prove malice for qualified privilege to fail.