The Supreme Court ruled that the particular concerns raised by a sentencing judge about possible insanity did not empower him to reject Sean Redmond’s guilty plea to causing serious harm. The court did not decide whether a judge might have that power in a different case where the evidence made an insanity verdict certain or nearly certain.
The case came to the Supreme Court as a consultative case stated from the Circuit Court. Redmond had pleaded guilty in July 2003 to causing serious harm under section 4(1) of the Non-Fatal Offences against the Person Act 1997. The alleged offence was a knife attack on Liam Humbar in Castlebar in November 2002. The case stated records that Humbar suffered serious injuries.
At a later sentencing hearing, the trial judge considered psychiatric reports and evidence about the circumstances of the attack. The judge said there were substantial grounds to believe Redmond might have been legally insane when he acted, and asked whether he could decline the guilty plea, enter a not guilty plea on Redmond’s behalf and have insanity investigated at trial. The judgment notes that Redmond was fit to plead when he entered his plea. It also records that his plea was described as tactical, reflecting a preference for a definite sentence over possible indefinite detention in the Central Mental Hospital.
The Supreme Court said insanity, whether concerning fitness to plead or responsibility at the time of an offence, is for a jury to determine. It stressed that the case stated did not establish that Redmond was insane under the traditional legal test, or that an insanity verdict was certain or nearly certain. The judge’s concerns arose from the medical material and his developing view of the law, including questions about substance-induced illness.
The court left open whether a judge could require a change of plea in a materially different case where the evidence appeared certain to require an insanity verdict. It held that the grounds in this case did not allow the judge to refuse the guilty plea. The court also rejected the suggestion that a sentencing judge cannot consider mental or physical factors that may mitigate or aggravate sentence merely because diminished responsibility is not a defence to criminal liability in Irish law.
The Supreme Court answered the specific question referred to it in those terms. The judgment did not determine the sentence or make a finding that Redmond was legally insane.