The High Court has refused an application to dismiss a dispute over land at Lisdoo, Dundalk, County Louth, for delay. Although the judge found that the plaintiff had failed to advance the case for 27 months without a reasonable excuse, she concluded that the balance of justice favoured letting it proceed.
The defendant’s motion, issued on 18 June 2003, sought dismissal for want of prosecution. The underlying claim concerns three title documents: a 1990 conveyance of Lisdoo to the plaintiff for IR£125,000; a trust declaration later that year stating that the plaintiff held the land for the defendant; and a 1996 conveyance transferring it to the defendant.
The plaintiff alleges that the trust declaration and 1996 conveyance were obtained without informed or any consent, and advances claims including deceit, breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, breach of contract and negligence. He also says he has no recollection of signing the documents or of dealings with the defendant having the meaning the defendant attributes to them. He seeks a declaration that they are equal beneficial owners. The defendant denies the allegations, says aspects of the claim are statute-barred, and counterclaims for slander of title. These are disputed claims, not findings in this ruling.
The judge identified two material delays before the dismissal motion: about a year before the defendant delivered a defence and counterclaim, and 27 months between their delivery and the motion. She considered both periods inordinate, but focused on the plaintiff’s 27-month delay. His explanation was that other litigation involving the defendant had distracted him. The judge held that those separate proceedings were not a reasonable excuse for leaving this case inactive.
The court also considered responsibility for the later delay. The dismissal application was ready for hearing by late May 2004 but was not heard until 25 February 2009. The judge said responsibility for that period was probably shared, while observing that the defendant could have brought his application on sooner. A separate motion by the defendant to vacate a lis pendens was struck out by agreement, with its costs reserved as costs in the cause.
In refusing dismissal, the judge noted that the defendant had provided no specific evidence that delay had made a fair trial impossible or caused other substantial prejudice. She weighed that against the potential harm to the plaintiff if barred from pursuing a claim to a valuable asset. The order dismisses the defendant’s application to strike out the proceedings; it does not decide ownership of Lisdoo or the merits of the underlying claims.