Judgment: 2010-06-09 · Court archive

High Court rules Ballymun lift picket lawful under trade-dispute law

The court found the union’s picketing met the statutory test because its members began picketing where their employer, Pickerings, was then working. The court acknowledged a prima facie trespass on council property but left the form of its order for further submissions.

High Court · [2010] IEHC 289

Who, what, where, when and why

Who
  • Dublin City Council (Plaintiff)
  • Technical Engineering & Electrical Union
  • Dermot Gannon
  • Tom Cummins (Defendant)
  • Pickerings
What

The court found the union’s picketing met the statutory test because its members began picketing where their employer, Pickerings, was then working. The court acknowledged a prima facie trespass on council property but left the form of its order for further submissions.

Where

Places mentioned in the report

  • Ballymun
When

Judgment:

Why

Reasons reported in the judgment

The court found that a trade dispute existed between the union and Pickerings over redundancies, including the selection of workers and extra-statutory redundancy payments. Pickerings had serviced and repaired lifts in the blocks under successive contracts since 1989. Six employees had worked there exclusively in recent years, and the company maintained a permanent base on site. The judge found it was working and carrying on business there when the picket began.

The High Court has ruled that picketing at Dublin City Council’s Ballymun apartment blocks was lawful under section 11(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1990. The ruling concerns a union dispute with lift contractor Pickerings and rests on the fact that Pickerings was working at the site when the picketing began on 4 February 2010.

Justice Laffoy delivered judgment on 9 June 2010 in the council’s action against the Technical Engineering & Electrical Union and union member Tom Cummins. Proceedings against the second named defendant, Dermot Gannon, who had not been served, were adjourned generally with liberty to re-enter. The court had refused the council’s application for an interlocutory injunction in April. At trial, the council no longer sought damages or injunctive relief, but sought a declaration that the picketing was unlawful.

The court found that a trade dispute existed between the union and Pickerings over redundancies, including the selection of workers and extra-statutory redundancy payments. Pickerings had serviced and repaired lifts in the blocks under successive contracts since 1989. Six employees had worked there exclusively in recent years, and the company maintained a permanent base on site. The judge found it was working and carrying on business there when the picket began.

The council’s contract with Pickerings ended on 25 March 2010. The judge found Pickerings was no longer working at the site after that date, even though some company property remained there. She nevertheless held that section 11(1) requires the employer to be working at the location when picketing starts; that condition need not continue while the court considers the case. She also found the picketing remained in furtherance of the dispute, as union representatives reasonably believed it could help advance their members’ interests.

The judgment described the picketing as peaceful: one or sometimes two union members walked with a placard, without disorder or blockading. The disruption to lift services was severe. When the case was heard, nine of 27 lifts were working after Army personnel began repairs; the council said it could not secure a contractor while the picket remained.

Justice Laffoy found the picketers were prima facie trespassing because they were on council property. She said moving the picket to the nearby public pavement would address that issue and concluded that picketing there, at the approaches to the site, would be lawful under section 11(1). The court did not decide whether the picketing was lawful at common law or determine the other ancillary issues. It also said the defendants were prima facie entitled to statutory immunity from tort claims under section 13. The judge reserved the form of order for further submissions; the judgment does not record the final order.

Read the original court judgment

Something looks wrong?

Highlight the relevant passage or flag this article for review. Review requests do not immediately change the report.

Email a correction request

Request a review