The Court of Appeal has dismissed Alan Phelan’s appeal against orders allowing Mars Capital Finance Ireland DAC to replace AIB Mortgage Bank as plaintiff and to seek execution of a 2016 consent judgment for €800,534.05. The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice Binchy on 23 May 2025, leaves the High Court orders in place; the appeal court did not itself make a new execution order.
AIB Mortgage Bank began proceedings in February 2015 seeking €767,235.57, interest and costs in connection with facilities advanced to Phelan between 2000 and 2007. In May 2016, an order made by consent directed that the original plaintiff recover €800,534.05. A four-month stay of execution was also ordered. AIB’s interest in the loans was later transferred to AIB Mortgage Bank, which transferred its interest in a series of loans, including Phelan’s, to Mars Capital under a deed dated 30 April 2021.
Mars Capital applied in December 2023 to be substituted as plaintiff and for leave to execute the judgment, which was more than six years old. The High Court granted both applications in February 2024. Phelan appealed, arguing that Mars Capital had not established its entitlement to the loans to the required standard, that it had not adequately explained the delay, and that he should have had more time to respond.
The Court of Appeal held that the relevant standard for the transfer application was the balance of probabilities. It concluded that the deed identified Mars Capital as the assignee. The fact that another company, Panelview DAC, provided the purchase money did not displace that conclusion. The court said Panelview might be a beneficial owner if Mars Capital held the assets on trust, but Mars Capital would still be the appropriate party to the proceedings as legal owner.
The court also rejected Phelan’s challenge concerning cross-examination of the respondent’s deponent. It held that leave was required for cross-examination on this post-judgment motion, and no relevant factual dispute requiring it had been identified. The transfer arguments raised were matters of law, the court said.
On delay, the court accepted that the initial stay, settlement discussions, Phelan’s personal insolvency process and the Covid-19 pandemic together accounted for about four years. It did not accept the respondent’s separate claim that defending other proceedings brought by Phelan justified delay. The remaining period before the application was made did not warrant overturning the High Court’s decision, the court concluded.
The court also dismissed the adjournment ground. Phelan had filed a substantial affidavit, and neither he nor his counsel identified what further arguments he would have made with more time. The appeal was dismissed. The court’s preliminary view was that the respondent should receive its appeal costs; it allowed Phelan two weeks to make written submissions on costs, with a further two weeks for a reply.