The High Court granted an applicant leave to pursue judicial review of a Refugee Appeals Tribunal decision on his asylum claim, finding substantial grounds in challenges to its credibility assessment and treatment of his claimed sexual orientation and internal relocation.
The applicant, identified as E.P.A., was a Ghanaian national who came to Ireland in March 2008 and claimed asylum on the basis of persecution related to being gay. The judgment records that he was married, had children, and that his family remained in Ghana.
The applicant said he had been involved in a gay rights organisation helping the Gay and Lesbian Association of Ghana organise an international conference in Ghana in 2006. The Tribunal relied on country information referring to the association denying that a conference had been planned. But the High Court noted another country report describing public opposition to an international lesbian and gay conference scheduled for Accra in September and saying the government banned it after religious leaders protested.
Justice Colm Mac Eochaidh said the Tribunal had not addressed evidence that appeared to corroborate the applicant’s account. Where country information conflicts, he said, a decision maker cannot rely on one version without explaining why it rejects the opposing evidence. The court found substantial grounds that the credibility findings were unlawful.
The judge also said the Tribunal appeared not to accept that the applicant was gay, but had not made a clear, reasoned finding on that central issue. The failure to decide it expressly was a substantial ground for judicial review.
On relocation within Ghana, the Tribunal had concluded the applicant could live safely elsewhere because the problems he alleged were local and there was nothing to suggest his sexuality would be discovered after moving. The High Court endorsed the approach set out by Lord Rodger in the UK Supreme Court case H.J. & H.T.: where an asylum seeker would live discreetly, the decision maker must consider why, including whether fear of persecution would be a material reason. The judge found substantial grounds that the Tribunal had not applied a similar approach and granted leave on that issue.
The court also observed that much of the Tribunal decision replicated the first-instance decision word for word, which might raise concern about independent consideration. Because the applicant had not pleaded that issue, it did not form part of the grounds granted leave. The judge separately declined to add a question about whether Ghana’s criminalisation of homosexuality could itself amount to persecution, saying it required full argument and should ideally be raised at first instance and on appeal.
The order was leave to pursue the reliefs sought on the specified pleaded grounds. The judgment did not determine the judicial review itself or the asylum claim.