The Supreme Court has dismissed Dublin City Council’s appeal in a dispute over whether an unpaid derelict-sites levy remained attached to a property after it was sold under an earlier mortgage.
The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice Brian Murray on 11 April 2024, concerned Michelle Maher, the plaintiff and respondent, and Dublin City Council, the defendant and appellant. The property had been subject to a levy imposed by the council in January 2008. It was removed from the Derelict Sites Register in August that year, but the levy was never paid.
Bank of Ireland held a mortgage granted in October 2007 by the property’s previous owner, Provale Construction Ltd. Maher acquired the property from the bank in September 2014 through an assignment under the mortgage’s powers. The dispute was whether the sale had transferred the property free of the council’s charge, which arose after the mortgage.
The council argued that the Derelict Sites Act 1990 provided that the charge would remain until the levy and interest were paid, and that this prevented the earlier mortgage sale from removing it. Maher argued that the bank’s exercise of its power of sale under the Conveyancing Act 1881 overreached the later charge: the council’s claim would be against the sale proceeds rather than the property.
The Court concluded that the 1990 Act did not displace the existing rules governing a mortgagee’s sale and the priority of property charges. It said the words “shall remain until payment” described how the original owner could release the charge; they did not remove a prior mortgagee’s statutory power to sell free of later charges over which its mortgage had priority.
The judgment also considered the statutory scheme for derelict-site designations and levies. A mortgagee not in possession was excluded from the Act’s definitions of owner and occupier, and had no right under the scheme to notice or to make representations about the designation or valuation. The Court said it would expect clear legislative language before concluding that a levy imposed through that process could disadvantage a prior mortgagee without those procedural rights.
The Court dismissed the appeal for the reasons in Mr Justice Murray’s judgment and those set out in greater detail in Ms Justice Baker’s judgment, with which he agreed. The supplied judgment contains Mr Justice Murray’s reasons; it does not state any separate order beyond dismissal of the appeal.