The High Court has permitted Sandra Coffey to represent her husband, Gabriel Coffey, in two personal injury claims against Tara Mines Limited, finding that exceptional circumstances justified an exception to the usual rule on who may appear for another litigant.
The ruling, delivered by Mr Justice O’Neill on 31 July 2007, concerned a preliminary issue about whether Mrs Coffey could represent her husband in the two proceedings. The claims had been adjourned during trial in November 2000 and had not resumed.
In one action, Gabriel Coffey claimed damages for dermatitis contracted in July 1991 and a shoulder injury suffered in May 1992, both during his employment with the defendants. Liability in that action had been conceded, leaving damages to be assessed. The second action concerned claimed neck and head injuries from a workplace fall on 15 May 1995; liability was contested.
The court heard that Mr Coffey had suffered a brain haemorrhage in 2005 and was left with a significant speech impediment. Medical letters described him as unable to give evidence for himself. Mrs Coffey told the court that he was not mentally impaired, but had substantial mobility restrictions and needed assistance. The judge found that his disabilities made him wholly incapable of representing himself in the cases.
His solicitor was removed from the record after the professional relationship broke down. Mrs Coffey said she had contacted 22 solicitors from a list supplied by the Law Society; seven replied, all declining to act. She also approached the Legal Aid Board. After directing her to make a formal application, the judge was satisfied that she had been unsuccessful in obtaining assistance.
The defendants opposed her request, relying on the general rule that only a party or a suitably qualified lawyer may represent a litigant. The Attorney General submitted that the court could have an inherent discretion to permit an unqualified advocate in very rare and exceptional cases. The judge held that the High Court had that jurisdiction to manage its proceedings and that the Supreme Court decision in Battle v The Irish Art Promotion Centre did not rule it out, since the point had not been argued there.
Justice O’Neill concluded that the combination of circumstances was exceptionally rare. Without permission for Mrs Coffey to act, he said, the claims would proceed no further, harming the interests of justice. He exercised his discretion to permit her to represent her husband in the two proceedings. The judgment does not decide the underlying claims or determine damages in either action.