Judgment: 2019-12-19 · Court archive

High Court strikes out delayed road accident claim

The court found the plaintiff’s delay in prosecuting a straightforward personal injury action was inordinate and inexcusable, and ruled that the balance of justice favoured dismissal.

High Court · [2019] IEHC 880

Who, what, where, when and why

Who
  • Robert Eagar (Judge)
What

The court found the plaintiff’s delay in prosecuting a straightforward personal injury action was inordinate and inexcusable, and ruled that the balance of justice favoured dismissal.

Where

Places mentioned in the report

  • Calmont Road, Ballymount, Dublin
  • Ballymount
  • Dublin
When

Judgment:

Other dates in the report
  • 2 December 2009

    The accident occurred on 2 December 2009 on a public road near Calmont Road, Ballymount, Dublin. The judgment records that the plaintiff applied to the Personal Injuries Assessment Board in November 2011 and issued proceedings in November 2012, shortly before the limitation period expired.

Why

Reasons reported in the judgment

The High Court has struck out a personal injury claim arising from a 2009 road accident, finding that the plaintiff’s delay in prosecuting the case was inordinate and inexcusable and that allowing it to proceed would prejudice the defendant’s prospect of a fair trial.

The High Court has struck out a personal injury claim arising from a 2009 road accident, finding that the plaintiff’s delay in prosecuting the case was inordinate and inexcusable and that allowing it to proceed would prejudice the defendant’s prospect of a fair trial.

The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice Robert Eagar on 19 December 2019, concerned the defendant’s application to dismiss the proceedings for want of prosecution. The court relied on its inherent jurisdiction. It did not determine the underlying allegation that the defendant caused the accident or the plaintiff’s claimed injuries.

The accident occurred on 2 December 2009 on a public road near Calmont Road, Ballymount, Dublin. The judgment records that the plaintiff applied to the Personal Injuries Assessment Board in November 2011 and issued proceedings in November 2012, shortly before the limitation period expired.

The defendant argued that the case had not been advanced promptly. Among the delays identified by the court were more than 14 months before initial replies to a notice for particulars were delivered, and more than three years before amended replies followed. The court also cited delays in providing discovery materials and changes of solicitor. It said the case was straightforward and was still not ready for trial nearly ten years after the accident.

The plaintiff accepted that there had been delay but disputed that it was inordinate or inexcusable. His solicitor pointed to correspondence between the parties, difficulties obtaining medical records after a treating doctor emigrated, and the defendant’s failure to deliver a defence. The plaintiff also argued that an incorrectly issued notice of trial showed an intention to continue the claim.

The court found the explanations did not satisfactorily account for the delays in replying to particulars. It said the plaintiff could have applied to compel delivery of a defence before issuing a notice for trial, and rejected the argument that the missing defence made the case ready for trial. It also found that the defendant’s failure to deliver a defence was not culpable conduct that outweighed the plaintiff’s delay.

Applying the principles in Primor plc v Stokes Kennedy Crowley, the court concluded that the delay was both inordinate and inexcusable, and that the balance of justice favoured dismissal. It ordered the proceedings struck out for want of prosecution. The order disposed of the claim; the judgment made no finding on liability for the accident or the extent of injury.

Read the original court judgment

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