The Supreme Court held that Alison Gough’s claim over an allegedly unnecessary hysterectomy was brought within the time limit under the Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act 1991. It also reduced the award for future general damages from €100,000 to €50,000, while upholding €150,000 for loss and suffering up to trial.
In a judgment delivered on 3 July 2003, Mr Justice McCracken said Gough knew within days that the hysterectomy had been performed. But the relevant knowledge for the statutory time limit was that the operation had been unnecessary, because that was the act alleged to constitute negligence. She had been told by her surgeon that the operation was necessary and had no reason to disbelieve him.
McCracken J rejected the appellants’ argument that knowing the operation was unnecessary necessarily meant knowing it had been carried out negligently. He said those were different things. The judgment said Gough’s knowledge that the operation may have been unnecessary appeared to have come from radio comments about other cases; her knowledge that it may have been negligent presumably came later, through a solicitor or professional medical advice. The judgment does not specify when she first learned the operation may have been unnecessary, but concluded that proceedings were issued within the statutory time limit from when she first had that knowledge. The court held her claim was not statute-barred.
On damages, McCracken J considered that Gough had suffered serious psychological trauma, severe depression and feelings of guilt. Her psychiatrist had said that, if her progress continued, he expected her to recover fully from clinical depression and to stop taking antidepressants a few weeks after final judgment, when she would feel justice had been done. The judge upheld €150,000 for general damages to trial but found the €100,000 future award unsustainable in light of that evidence. He reduced it to €50,000, while noting the lasting burden of the unnecessary operation.
The source contains McCracken J’s judgment only. It identifies the Supreme Court judges hearing the appeal but does not set out a formal order or explain the precise disposition of every part of the appeal.