The Supreme Court dismissed Francis Declan Cavey’s appeal against a High Court decision striking out his claim that his late father had promised to leave him the family home.
The Court held that the promissory-estoppel proceedings were statute barred under section 9 of the Civil Liability Act 1961. It ruled that a claim of this kind, if it existed, arose from the deceased’s failure during his lifetime to make a will giving effect to the alleged promise. It therefore counted as a claim that survived against the estate and had to be brought within two years of the death.
Maurice Paul Cavey died on 18 December 2006. His will named Aidan Cavey, Jane O’Donoghue and Pamela O’Rourke as executors, and probate was granted to them in March 2008. Francis Declan Cavey alleged that his parents had represented he would inherit the family home and that he relied on that representation. The judgment records the claim as an allegation; the Court did not determine whether the alleged promise was made or enforceable.
He first brought proceedings under section 117 of the Succession Act 1965, seeking proper provision from his father’s estate. Those proceedings were dismissed in 2009. He appealed, then withdrew that appeal in July 2010. He started the promissory-estoppel proceedings on 27 July 2010, more than three and a half years after his father’s death.
On appeal, Cavey argued that his first proceedings had been brought within the limitation period and that he had raised promissory estoppel at their hearing. The Supreme Court rejected that argument. It said the first case was pleaded only under section 117, and that the earlier judge had ruled that this was the sole claim before her. A reference to promissory estoppel during the hearing did not add that claim to the proceedings.
The Court concluded that the earlier proceedings were dismissed and no longer in being, and did not include the cause of action now advanced. It upheld the High Court’s decision that the second proceedings were time barred and dismissed the appeal. Because of that conclusion, it did not decide the executors’ alternative argument that the case was an abuse of process.