The Supreme Court extended the time for Goode Concrete to appeal three High Court orders, but restricted the appeals to grounds connected with its allegation of a reasonable apprehension of objective bias. The ruling did not decide whether the allegation was established.
The appeals concerned a High Court refusal of an interlocutory injunction, an order requiring security for costs, and a later order setting the amount and phasing of that security. The orders were perfected between February 2011 and May 2012. Goode’s extension applications were issued on 11 December 2012, well outside the usual 21-day appeal period.
Goode alleged that the High Court trial judge’s shareholding in CRH gave rise to an apprehension of bias. The judge had disclosed a shareholding before contentious proceedings began, and no party objected at that time. Goode said it learned on 26 September 2012 that the financial interest was larger than it had understood. After seeking further information, it asked the judge to recuse himself. The case was transferred to another judge.
Justice Clarke said the usual criteria for extending appeal time remained relevant, including whether there was an arguable appeal and the circumstances of the delay. But where an appeal depended on facts outside the material before the High Court, the Court should also consider when those facts became known, whether further inquiry was reasonable, the time taken to apply, and any prejudice from the delay.
The Court considered that Goode had acted within a reasonable period while clarifying information about the judge’s private assets. It found the bias ground arguable, including the questions of whether the initial disclosure amounted to waiver and whether Goode should have made further inquiries earlier. Those were questions for the appeals, not findings that bias had occurred.
Goode also sought to appeal other aspects of the High Court decisions, including the security-for-costs ruling in light of a later Supreme Court decision concerning unlimited companies and nominal plaintiffs. The Court refused to extend time for those grounds: they could have been raised within the original appeal period, and later legal developments did not themselves justify a late appeal.
The Court therefore granted extensions for all three appeals, confined to the reasonable-apprehension-of-bias issue. It did not determine the underlying appeals or the merits of Goode’s other proposed grounds.