The High Court has refused an applicant’s request to stop a District Court prosecution, finding that culpable delay in bringing the case to hearing was not enough, in the circumstances, to justify that relief.
In a judgment delivered on 28 July 2006, Finnegan P. considered an application for judicial review by Damien Menton against the Director of Public Prosecutions. The applicant was charged over an alleged offence on 7 March 2003. He argued that the time taken to bring the case to hearing breached his constitutional right to a fair trial within a reasonable time and his rights under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The matter was listed for hearing on 5 November 2003, but the assigned court lacked facilities to display video footage. It was later adjourned over disclosure issues, the absence of a custody record, court-list pressures and the unavailability of the judge who had begun hearing the case. A further adjournment from 9 February 2005 followed an accident that left the prosecuting Garda unavailable. The next hearing date was set for 29 June 2005. The applicant had received leave to bring the judicial review application on 21 February 2005.
Finnegan P. attributed periods of four months, two months and five months to the prosecution, based on gaps in the explanations provided. He said the overall culpable delay was “borderline”, while also referring to it as 11 months. The judgment noted that the case had proceeded expeditiously at earlier stages, that the Garda’s accident was not culpable, and that the evidence and disclosure issue required additional court time. The judge also found no evidence that the District Court’s inability to manage overlong lists was endemic.
The court held that the case did not fall within the earlier decision in D.P.P. v Arthurs. That decision did not establish that every District Court prosecution must conclude within two years and three months, the judge said; each case depends on its own circumstances. The judgment’s chronology records a total lapse of two years and three months by the scheduled hearing date.
Finnegan P. also observed that applications of this kind should generally be made to the trial judge, with judicial review reserved for exceptional circumstances. The court refused the relief sought. It did not rule on the underlying criminal charge.