The High Court quashed a drink-driving conviction after finding that comments by the District Judge established objective bias and that the accused had not had an opportunity to respond at the appropriate time.
In a judgment delivered on 11 March 2015, Ms Justice Kennedy ruled that the court had jurisdiction to grant certiorari even though the accused’s appeal in the Circuit Court was part heard. She refused, however, to grant an order prohibiting further steps in the proceedings or declaratory relief.
The judicial review challenged convictions imposed on 23 October 2012. The applicant had been fined €500 for drink driving and disqualified from driving on public roads for three years. He had also been fined €300 for careless driving. The court record said that this fine was imposed instead of a dangerous-driving allegation, to which he had pleaded not guilty. The applicant had pleaded guilty to driving without a valid NCT certificate.
The applicant argued that two of seven summonses had not been served before the hearing. His solicitor had raised their absence in court on 3 October 2012, and Garda Alan Murray then gave him photocopies. The respondents said all seven summonses had already been properly served and that the copies were provided to assist the court and applicant.
Justice Kennedy did not decide whether service had been defective. She held that any defect would have been cured when the applicant appeared in court with his solicitor some 20 days later.
The court did find objective bias. The applicant alleged that the District Judge misidentified him and suggested he had perjured himself and pressured another person to do so. The judge accepted that he had made an error in identifying the applicant and apologised in correspondence. The respondents said the comments came after conviction but before sentence. The court concluded that the applicant had raised the issue immediately and could not have asked the judge to recuse himself after the conviction decision had been made.
The judicial review was brought about 17 months after the challenged decision. The court described the delay as inexcusable and noted that no explanation had been given. It nevertheless allowed the case to proceed, finding that the balance of justice favoured relief on the unusual facts, and rejected the arguments that the pending appeal or delay barred the remedy.
The court quashed the impugned order. Its ruling did not grant prohibition or declaratory relief.