The Supreme Court has ruled that a notice of a proposed forfeiture application did not amount to an application made while £79,960 was detained under the Criminal Justice Act 1994. It answered a case-stated question from the High Court in the negative.
The cash was seized from David Anthony England at Dublin Airport on 15 May 1998. District Court orders authorised its detention in successive periods, the last of which expired on 5 May 1999. No further District Court detention order was made, and England had not been charged with an offence relating to the cash or for which it was evidence.
The Director of Public Prosecutions issued a notice of motion dated 23 April 1999, but it was apparently served with a letter dated 2 June. The notice said counsel would apply to the Circuit Court on 29 June for forfeiture. The application was made on that date, after the detention order had expired.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether issuing the notice in April counted as making the application while the cash was still detained, as required by section 39. The DPP argued for a broad, purposive interpretation. England argued that the document was only notice of a future application and that the words should carry their ordinary meaning.
Giving judgment on 16 May 2011, Mr Justice Hardiman said the statutory wording was not obscure or ambiguous and did not justify departing from its ordinary and natural meaning. He noted that, in this case, the DPP accepted that England, as the person claiming the money, needed to be served. The court considered that this made the case more directly analogous to a motion on notice, which is not made until notice has been given to the parties concerned.
The court concluded that the notice of the proposed application was not itself an application made while the money was detained under section 38. It therefore answered the High Court judge’s question in the negative. The judgment does not record a forfeiture order or a separate order directing the release of the cash.