The High Court quashed a Department of Justice decision concerning whether a Malaysian mother’s immigration permissions should be changed, finding that it failed to address the substance of her request. The matter was remitted to the Minister for Justice for further consideration.
The case arose after an Irish passport issued to the woman’s daughter, Charlotte Puong, was cancelled. The child was born in Ireland on 30 January 2018. Under the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956, a parent had to have at least three years’ reckonable residence during the four years before the birth for the child to qualify for citizenship by birth.
The mother, Phei Wooi Chew, had Stamp 2 permissions from January 2014 to July 2015, followed by Stamp 3 permissions. The court explained that Stamp 2 permission for study did not count towards the residence requirement, while the relevant Stamp 3 periods did. On the permissions then recorded, the required three years were not met.
The applicants’ solicitors argued that Chew should have received Stamp 3 permission during the earlier period because she remained married to, and dependent on, her husband, despite their separation. They asked the Department of Justice to confirm that position or vary the permissions. The department’s reply of 22 March 2019 said it could not provide the requested confirmation and referred to the separation, but did not address whether the permissions should be varied.
Justice Max Barrett held that the reply amounted to a decision and that it failed to engage with the central issue raised. The court found for the applicants on that ground, while stressing that the earlier period could count only if the Stamp 2 permissions were varied to Stamp 3.
The court rejected the challenge to the Foreign Affairs Minister’s handling of the passport cancellation. It said the minister was not satisfied that the child had the necessary prior entitlement to citizenship and had no power to change immigration permissions. The court did not determine the applicants’ argument about the proportionality of cancelling the passport, as it was unnecessary to do so after its finding on the Justice Minister’s decision.
The ministers also argued that Chew had shown a lack of candour about her relationship and dependency circumstances. The court said she might have matters to explain on reconsideration, but found that the allegation did not justify refusing to quash the decision. It made no finding that she had committed wrongdoing.